Adnane Kaab: “Air superiority begins with the ability not to lose one’s footing on the ground”

The best‑equipped armed forces in Europe have found themselves unable to intercept drones costing just a few hundred euros flying over their military bases. How can a credible and economically sustainable counter‑drone system be designed in the face of the threat of saturation by drone swarms?

Counter‑drone defence highlights a structural difficulty that many actors are only now beginning to grasp. Costly systems are still often deployed to intercept extremely low‑cost threats, creating an economic imbalance that is difficult to sustain over time. The problem is not so much technical as systemic.

Recent incidents observed across several theatres of operation, involving low‑value drones flying over or around ostensibly well‑protected bases, illustrate this limitation. Some of the most expensive defence systems in the world are now being circumvented by some of the simplest technologies.

This is not an isolated failure, but rather the symptom of a defence model designed for rarer, more visible and more expensive threats. Even systems reputed for their performance become ineffective when faced with saturation. A credible system can no longer rely solely on sophisticated means.

It must combine several layers of response, integrate cost‑controlled solutions and, above all, remain adaptable in the face of a rapidly evolving threat. The central question is not how to intercept every drone, but how to build a defence capable of enduring over time without becoming economically exhausted.

As a former fighter pilot, you experienced air superiority as a dogma. Today, an F‑16 costing 80 million dollars can be neutralised on the ground by a 2,000‑dollar drone. How should armed forces rethink the balance between costly conventional platforms and more numerous, more adaptable drone capabilities?

The fighter aircraft is not obsolete, but it has become vulnerable in an environment for which it was not designed to operate on its own. For decades, air superiority was conceived as the ability to impose control in the skies.

Today, it begins with the ability not to lose one’s assets on the ground. The real risk is not investing in advanced platforms, but doing so without adapting the entire system that surrounds them. A combat aircraft that is not integrated into a protective framework becomes a target, regardless of its performance in flight.

The challenge, therefore, is not to replace existing systems but to rethink their operating environment. This requires a finer balance between high‑value capabilities and simpler, more numerous and more adaptable means. Power is no longer measured by what one possesses, but by what one is able to protect and regenerate.